

the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on a 14-3 vote. We had one Member who was absent, dealing with some business in Florida. It is my understanding had that Member been there, this actually would have come out of committee on a 15-3 vote. So I emphasize, first of all, this bill has been through the committee process. On the other hand, events on the ground have changed since the bill came out of committee. Things have evolved since it came out of committee. I hope there is an open amendment process to make adjustments to the bill to take into account some of the things that have occurred on the ground since that time.

Look, I know all of us want to strongly support Ukraine. I know all of us strongly condemn what Russia and Putin have done recently in Crimea, and I think all of us understand that what we want to do is to stop that aggression from moving on into the southern and eastern portions of Ukraine. So we are trying to respond in a way that sends a signal to Russia, sends a signal to those who have been involved in these illicit activities, that they should at least stop on the Crimean border and, hopefully, over time they will recede from Crimea. What we are trying to do is prevent further aggression in this area.

I think everyone understands it has been our policy for 70 years as the United States to promote a democratic whole and free Europe. So what is happening with Russia and Crimea—and hopefully not in Ukraine, although there is no doubt they have fomented many of the problems that have occurred there—what we are attempting to do is to ensure that Europe remains free, democratic, and whole.

I know everybody here remembers the fact that Ukraine was a place of numbers of nuclear weapons from Russia. When the Soviet Union broke apart in 1991, there was a huge arsenal of nuclear weapons and warheads in Ukraine. We signed an agreement called the Budapest Memorandum with the United Kingdom, Russia, and Ukraine relative to Ukraine's sovereignty if they were willing to give up these nuclear weapons. So it is very much in our national interests that we prevent Russia from breaking up and dealing nefariously with the sovereignty of Ukraine.

We have crafted a bill which does three things. No. 1, it provides economic aid. I think everyone in this body understands the tremendous economic problems Ukraine is experiencing. I think we all understand the first thing that has to happen in Ukraine is it has to be stabilized economically. Therefore, the administration has pledged \$1 billion in aid. This bill backs that up in a way that allows that to occur. Obviously, Congress has to approve spending, which is associated with loan guarantees. These loan guarantees, by the way, would not take effect until after Ukraine has signed an IMF agreement that makes sure they

are going to go through the structural processes necessary to make sure they do what actually causes them to be a more successful country.

The bill also deals with sanctions. I think everyone knows there have been numbers of people who have been involved nefariously in dealing internally in Ukraine with their sovereignty issues, but there also have been numbers of corrupt officials in Russia who have affected what is happening in Ukraine, and this bill sanctions both. We are sending a very strong message. Economic aid is important, but I also think sanctioning the bad behavior and Russia understanding there are going to be additional sanctions put in place is important.

I wish to thank the administration for the sanctions that have been put in place. I thought it was a big step to put in place sectoral sanctions, or when they said they had the ability through Executive order to do that. What I hope will happen, and what we have pressed for out of our office, is they will implement some of those sectoral sanctions to send a shock wave through the Russian economy that in the event they do anything to come into Ukraine while they are amassing troops on the border—if they do anything in that regard—this is just the beginning.

I think all of us understand Russia is in a place where their economy is weak and we know the ruble has depreciated greatly in value. We understand our best asset against them right now is sanctions that would hurt them economically and certainly affect those people who sit around Putin and affect him in big ways.

The third piece of this bill is IMF reform. I join a number of people who believe the IMF reforms that have been laid out are important. They are important to the world. I talk to my friends on this side of the aisle who I think may have more of an isolationist bent, and I say that one of the things that is most important for us as a nation is to have an entity such as the IMF—it is not perfect, it makes mistakes, but it is the entity that everything in the world is looking to right now to help usher Ukraine from where they are to a place that is prosperous and has the ability to improve the standard of living of Ukrainians, which is very important from the standpoint of their stability.

So we are all focused on the IMF. We have people on my side of the aisle who again have become more isolationist, less adventurous, if you would, relative to—which is where the country is, I understand. But what the IMF does is allow us to share the risk of stabilizing countries such as Ukraine with other countries around the world. I think all of us understand the threats to global stability are greater today than they have been in the past. So there was an agreed-to set of reforms that took place back in 2010. I strongly support—I strongly support—those reforms and,

as a matter of fact, would say Ukraine is the poster child for why we need to have an IMF that is functioning at a much higher level.

We account for a transfer from something called the NAB, if you will—it is a line of credit that we have; it is out there; it is a liability our Nation has—and we transfer \$63 billion of that \$100 billion over to something that is in a basket of currency. So we are not taking on any additional liabilities. Yet there is a pay-for aspect of this through the budgeting process that is fully accounted for in this bill.

Again, I join Dr. Henry Kissinger, Dr. Condoleezza Rice, former Secretary Jim Baker in saying and knowing we should adopt these IMF reforms.

These are the three big elements of this bill. We have some democracy assistance. We have some authorized sums to help us build stronger relationships with our allies. But I strongly support this piece of legislation. I think this piece of legislation is a full package. It is a package that deals with the three aspects that need to be dealt with at this time.

Ukraine is, again, the poster child of why we want to have a fully functioning IMF. Look, I know there are going to be amendments offered. There actually have been some already. I hope we will have a full and open process, with amendments that are relevant to what we are dealing with on the floor. I think the bill can be improved.

It is my hope, as we move through this week, that we will have the opportunity for those amendments to be heard and voted on but, at the same time, by the time the week ends and we head back to our respective States we will have, in a unified way, sent a message to Russia, sent a message to the people of Ukraine as to where this body stands relative to their support economically, relative to sanctions that we believe strongly should be put in place against Russia, and how we believe the IMF should be functioning as a stabilizing force in the world.

With that, I yield the floor.

CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Morning business is closed.

SUPPORT FOR THE SOVEREIGNTY, INTEGRITY, DEMOCRACY, AND ECONOMIC STABILITY OF UKRAINE ACT OF 2014—MOTION TO PROCEED

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will resume consideration of the motion to proceed to S. 2124, which the clerk will report.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

Motion to proceed to Calendar No. 329, S. 2124, a bill to support sovereignty and democracy in Ukraine, and for other purposes.

Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. RUBIO. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. RUBIO. Mr. President, my understanding is we are on the motion to proceed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. We are.

Mr. RUBIO. I wanted to speak about the issue of Ukraine. I get a lot of questions, phone calls, emails about it. It has certainly been on the minds of a lot of people across the country. The most common question that I get is: What do we do about it? What can we do? Related to that is the question of: Why does this even matter?

I am going to get to that in my conclusion. But on this motion that is now before the Senate, where we are being asked to vote on a package of sanctions and also assistance to Ukraine, I wanted to first outline what it is we can do moving forward in addition to this bill that is before us, but also why this bill that is before us is so important.

I think there are a couple of things that we really need to focus on in terms of our reaction to what has happened with regards to Crimea and with Ukraine, in particular, because of the Russian actions that have been taken.

First and most important we need to help the Ukrainian people and the interim government in Ukraine to protect its nation's sovereignty but also to protect its transition to democracy—to full democracy.

They have elections scheduled in May of this year. For these elections it is going to be critical that they go off smoothly, that they are free and they are fair because that is an important step in their transition to democracy.

But we should anticipate that Russia, through Putin, is going to do everything it can to disrupt these elections, to delegitimize these elections. We already see evidence in open source reporting in the media that, in fact, there are highly trained agitators sponsored by the Kremlin that have found their way into Ukraine and could potentially participate in ways to try to disrupt these elections.

So I think one of the first things we can do, working with our allies in Europe, is to help them with the logistical support they need to carry out in May elections that are free and are fair and to help them with the biggest step they are going to take so far towards a transition to democracy in Ukraine.

The second action we need to take to help Ukraine to protect its sovereignty and to make its transition to democracy is to help them stabilize their economy. You can imagine that this disruptive change in government, combined with an invasion of its terri-

tories, has been highly disruptive to their economy, which was already feeling some real constraints. That is why the bill before us is so critical. In addition to some of the direct assistance, it will help them access loans that will allow them to stabilize their economic situation.

What we can anticipate is that Russia is going to do everything it can to disrupt their economy. Again, the Russian argument here is—it is a ridiculous argument. But the argument they are making to the world is: Ukraine is a failed state. The Russian-speaking population is being threatened. So we have to get involved. We must intervene to try to stabilize that situation.

That is the argument they have made in Crimea. Increasingly, that is the argument they seem to be making with regard to Eastern Ukraine. So the bill before us is critical because it will be a major step on the part of this government to do its part, in conjunction with our allies in Europe, to help Ukrainians stabilize their economy.

As I have shared before, I have some real concerns about some of the language that is in this bill. It has to do with these changes to the IMF that I do not think belong in this legislation. I do not think they belong in this legislation for two reasons. One, I do not think that we should be taking up an issue of that importance in this manner. We should have a full debate. That should be dealt with separately. But I also think it was a mistake by this administration to include the IMF language in this bill because what we need as much as anything else is not just to pass this bill out of the Senate but to pass it with the most amount of support possible.

I want to see it be 100 to 0 or 95 to 5 so we can send a very strong message to Russia and the world that the United States of America and her people are firmly on the side of Ukraine's sovereignty and Ukraine's desire for independence from Russia and its ability to stabilize itself in moving forward. That, quite frankly, is endangered as a result of the administration's decision to push this divisive language into this bill. There was no reason for them to do that.

In fact, that sentiment is not a Republican sentiment. It is being echoed in the House, where a number of Democrats today are quoted in newspaper articles as saying that this is a mistake, that they should never have done this. If they were to take this language out, you would pass a bill in the House and Senate this week. We could have passed one before we left 2 weeks ago. Instead, it continues to have to go through a prolonged debate and divisiveness.

There are people who have had to vote against it here on the floor because they feel so strongly about the IMF language. We could have had their support. We could have sent a stronger message than the one that is being sent now.

I have those concerns. By the way, there was a statement made on the

floor yesterday that I think deserves to be addressed. The majority leader stood here and said that, basically, the reason that—Republicans are responsible for the loss of Crimea in an effort to help a family that is engaged in American politics. I think that statement is absurd and ridiculous. I think it is the kind of hyperbole that in issues such as this has no place.

At some point there have to be issues so big and so important to the national security of this country that they are above politics and above that sort of statement. That being said, while I share the same concerns that many of my colleagues do about the IMF language, and initially expressed my position that I was not willing to vote for this bill with it, after much thought and consideration over the last couple of weeks, researching the issues, I made the conclusion that in the cost-benefit analysis, helping Ukraine stabilize itself, helping Ukraine stabilize its economy, given the importance of this issue, it is so important that I am prepared to vote for this despite the fact that it has something in it that I do not like. That is how important I think this issue truly is.

Oftentimes in foreign policy that is what we are called to do. We are called to make pragmatic decisions that are in the best interests of America and our allies around the world, even if it is less than ideal or perhaps not the complete solution that we want. That is why I voted to proceed with the debate on this bill yesterday. That is why I am prepared to support it despite the inclusion of IMF language that I am strongly against—because I think this issue is that important.

The third thing we can do to help Ukraine protect its sovereignty and make its full transition to democracy is to help them with their defense capability. Now, understand that when the Soviet Union fell in the early 1990s, Ukraine was left with the world's third largest stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear weapons on the planet.

But they signed this agreement with the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia that basically said: If you give up your nuclear weapons, we, these three countries that signed this, will provide for your defense and assure you of your defense. So Ukraine did that. They gave up these weapons. This was signed in 1994, and 20 years later, one of the three countries that signed that agreement has not just not provided for their defense, they actually invaded them.

I want to make a point on this for a second. Think about if you were one of these other countries around the world right now that feels threatened by your neighbors, and the United States and the rest of the world are going to you and saying: Listen, do not develop nuclear weapons. Do not develop nuclear weapons, South Korea. Do not develop nuclear weapons, Japan. Do not develop nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia.

We will protect you. We will watch out for you.

What kind of lesson do you think this instance sends to them? I think the message this is sending to many nations around the world is: Perhaps we can no longer count on the security promises made by the free world. Perhaps we need to start looking out for ourselves. That is why the Ukrainian situation is so more important than simply what is happening in Europe. This has implications around the world.

There are a number of countries around the world now that are considering increasing their defense capabilities, including a nuclear capacity, because they feel threatened by neighbors that have a nuclear capacity themselves. So far they have held back because they have relied on the United States and our partners to assure them that they do not need these weapons, that we have their back. But now when something like this happens, these countries see it as further evidence that potentially those sorts of assurances are no longer enough in the 21st century.

That raises the real risk that over the next 2 decades, you could see an explosion in the number of countries around the world that possess a nuclear weapons capability because they now feel that they must protect themselves and can no longer rely on other countries to do it for them.

So how can we help Ukraine with its military and defense capabilities? By providing them assistance. By the way, the Ukraine military capability degraded not just because of their overconfidence in these assurances that were made to them, but there was also corruption in that government. In fact, the previous president who was ousted by a popular revolt, that president actually undermined the defense capabilities of that country and took a lot of that money and used it for internal control, to be able to control his own population instead of being able to protect his country.

So what can we do to help? The first thing that I have called for us to do is to provide Ukraine with more military equipment and more training. We should work with our NATO allies and the European Union to help equip and train the Ukrainian military forces so that they can protect the country now and moving forward. We can also share intelligence information with them to help them better position their assets and understand and have a better awareness of what is going on around them.

We can also help them with logistical support. These are the sorts of things that I hope this administration will take steps toward in the next couple of days. So that is the first thing we can do. We can help Ukraine protect its sovereignty and make its full transition to democracy.

The second thing we need to do is we need to continue to raise the price on

Putin for the invasion of Crimea. We need to change the calculation, the cost-benefit calculation that he is going to go through as he decides whether to move into Eastern Ukraine now and potentially even parts of Moldova.

So already some steps have been taken in that regard. I applaud the administration for having additional sanctions announced last week. I think we are going to have to continue to do more in conjunction with our allies. I think we need to add more names of individuals, of financial institutions, and of businesses, primarily those who have links to this invasion, but also Russia's involvement in supporting the Syrian regime as it carries out the mass slaughter of its own people.

I think we need to suspend our civil and nuclear cooperation agreement that was entered into as part of the 123 agreement 4 years ago as a strong message to them. I think we need to reassess the role that NATO plays in Europe. NATO was largely built around the Soviet risks in Western Europe.

Then, after the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, NATO kind of lost its way a little bit in terms of its role in Europe because there was no threat. In fact, you saw some of these countries saying, you know, it is likely that NATO's role now will be about operations in the Middle East or in Africa and being involved in threats there as opposed to actually having to defend our own territory.

The facts on the ground in Europe have changed dramatically in the last 2 months. You now, in fact, do have a powerful military force in the region that has shown a willingness to invade a neighbor. They did this in 2008 in Georgia. They are doing it again now in a way that is even more egregious and outrageous. I think it is time for NATO to reevaluate its capabilities, given this new threat that is here to stay.

Also, the time has come for NATO to reposition its assets to face this threat and this risk. I think and I hope that those conversations are happening now. I think for NATO, in many respects, it is time to reinvigorate this alliance. It has a clear and present danger in Europe in the form of the government of Vladimir Putin, who threatens his neighbors and the stability of Europe. So now I think NATO has found a reason to reinvigorate itself.

The last point I would make, in terms of changing the calculus, is the real stranglehold Russia has on Europe. It is not simply its military capabilities, it is its natural resources. Much of Europe depends on Russia for its oil and natural gas. This creates a tremendous amount of leverage on their neighbors. One of the reasons we have seen some countries in Europe reluctant to move forward on even higher sanctions is because they are afraid of losing access to the natural gas and oil from Russia that their economy depends on.

We need to change that. That can't happen overnight, but we need to begin to change that; first, by increasing our exports to those countries and particularly Ukraine. I know Senator BARRASSO will have an amendment as part of this debate that I hope will be considered that will allow us to export more natural gas to Ukraine. But what also needs to happen is other countries in Europe need to develop their own domestic capabilities in natural gas so they can become less reliant on Russia for these resources and become more reliant on themselves and free countries in the region to be able to do that. That is a critical component of a long-term strategy in all of this.

Let me close by answering the question I began with. Why does this matter? I think this matters for a lot of different reasons. I have highlighted one, in terms of decisions being made around the world and governments deciding whether they are going to pursue their own domestic nuclear weapons capability, but there is another that perhaps we need to think about.

After World War II—in fact, after the last century when the world went through two devastating World Wars—there was a commitment made that no longer would nations be allowed to aggressively invade other countries and take over territory and exercise illegitimate claims. In fact, international norms were established at the end of World War II. There were some conflicts during the Cold War with Russia, with the Soviet Union, and with the spread of communism, but by and large, especially since the end of the Cold War, that has been the established norm.

It is not acceptable in the late 20th century and in the early 21st century for a country to simply make up an excuse and invade a neighbor and take their lands and territory. That was perhaps the way of the world 300 years ago, 200 years ago, and 100 years ago, and there were massive wars and loss of life as a result of countries doing that, but the world grew tired of these conflicts and decided we will no longer tolerate or accept these sorts of things. If you recall, in the early 1990s, Saddam Hussein did that. He invaded Kuwait. The entire world community rallied around the United States of America to expel him as a result of that illegitimate action.

In the 21st century, we have the most egregious violation of that norm. We basically have Russia deciding they don't like the way things are going in Ukraine so they decide to invade. They decided to take over a territory. Think about how they did it. They denied ever doing it. They sent Russian troops into Crimea, but they had them wear uniforms that had no markings on them. In fact, the press would ask these soldiers: Where are you from, and they wouldn't answer. They invaded a country but lied about their invasion. They claimed these were local defense forces that had rallied around the Russian flag. They made up this excuse

that somehow the Russian-speaking population in the region was being oppressed and attacked and was in danger and so they needed to intervene.

To this day, Russia still will not admit the military role they are playing on the ground in Crimea. So in addition to violating this international norm, which is an outrageous behavior, they have lied about it and think they can get away with it. The point I am making is, if in the 21st century a country is allowed to invade a neighbor, lie about it and lie about the reasons for it and they can get away with it without significant costs, we have created a dangerous precedent with which we are going to have to live. All over the world there are powerful nations that can now claim land they do not control belongs to them.

I took a trip in February to Asia. I visited Japan and the Philippines and South Korea. You know what the No. 1 fear in that region is. That China has similar claims to Russia. They claim all sorts of pieces of territory and of oceans that belong to them. They claim it belonged to them 1,000 years ago and should belong to them now. They have taken a different tack, but the point is, if we now live in a world where a country can make territorial claims and then simply act on them without any repercussions from the international community, then I think the 21st century is starting to look more and more like the early 20th century, a time that subjected the world to two devastating World Wars.

We cannot allow this to go unpunished. The only way this can be punished is if the free countries of the world rally together and impose sanctions and costs on Vladimir Putin and his cronies for having taken this action. That will never happen—the free world will never be able to rally to impose those costs—unless the United States leads that effort. We can't do it alone, but it cannot be done without us.

That is why it is so important that measures such as the one the Senate now is considering happen with the highest amount of bipartisan support we can muster. We may not agree with every aspect of it—I certainly do not—but we must weigh the equities. If we were to put this on a scale, the need to do something about Ukraine so far outweighs the things about the legislation before us that we don't like because of the implications it has not just on our Nation but on the world and the role we must play. If some other country around the world fails to pass sanctions, fails to take steps or does so in a way that is divided, it might have some impact, but when the United States fails to act in a decisive way, it has a dramatic impact.

One of the arguments our adversaries around the world use is asking our allies: Why are you still in the camp of the United States? They ask: Why are you still allying yourself with the United States? They are unreliable.

Their government is always bickering and deeply divided. They can't come together in Washington to do anything. Do you think, if you are ever invaded or ever get into trouble, the United States could possibly muster the domestic political support necessary for them to come to your assistance? Don't count on America. Count on us or count on yourself.

I have already explained why there is danger in that, but that is the argument these countries use against us. What I fear is that if we fail to take decisive and unified action in this body, in the Senate, to send a strong message—and while we may not agree on every component of this, and I have already said I believe it was a mistake for the administration to push for that IMF reform language—if we do not send a strong and decisive message, then I think this will be spun against us. I think this will be used as evidence to our allies and other countries around the world why America is no longer reliable, either economically or militarily.

The consequences of that could extend far beyond Europe into other regions of the world, such as Asia. This is not a game. This is not some domestic political dispute. This issue has ramifications that will directly impact the kind of world our children will inherit. In fact, it will dramatically impact the kind of world we will have to live in over the next 20, 30, and 40 years. We cannot afford to make a mistake. We cannot afford to be wrong.

I hope I can convince as many of my colleagues as possible to support this legislation, with all of its flaws, so we can send a clear message that on these issues we are united as a people and as a nation and that we remain committed to U.S. global leadership.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The assistant majority leader.

PHILIPPINES CHARITABLE GIVING ASSISTANCE ACT

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I understand we have an announcement from the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

Under the previous order, the Senate having received H.R. 3771, the text of which is identical to S. 1821, the Senate will proceed to consideration of the measure, which the clerk will report.

The assistant bill clerk read as follows:

A bill (H.R. 3771) to accelerate the income tax benefits for charitable cash contributions for the relief of victims of the Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, H.R. 3771 is read a third time and passed, S. 1821 is indefinitely postponed, and the motions to reconsider are considered made and laid upon the table.

SUPPORT FOR THE SOVEREIGNTY, INTEGRITY, DEMOCRACY, AND ECONOMIC STABILITY OF UKRAINE ACT OF 2014—MOTION TO PROCEED—Continued

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I enjoyed very much the remarks of the Senator from Florida. He is very much concerned about this, very much plugged into the situation of what is happening in Ukraine, but I would like to make a couple of comments about that from a slightly different perspective, one that is from my current position as the ranking member on the Senate Armed Services Committee.

I would like to look at just one part of this proposal; that is, the money that would be coming out of the military to take care of a problem the military should not have to take care of at a time when things are very serious. The IMF has all the authority it needs to meet all of Ukraine's borrowing needs—that is the \$35 billion—with its existing commitments from the global community. The IMF does not need additional U.S. funds to help Ukraine. It does not make sense to double the size of the IMF by ratifying a 2010 agreement, paying for it with money that could be used by DOD to address the shortfalls which I am going to talk about.

By the way, there is another option out there because the House has a bill. Chairman ROYCE of the House Foreign Affairs Committee is marking up a bill today as we are speaking that I believe addresses our response to Ukraine in a more responsible way. The House bill is likely to provide \$68 billion in Ukraine aid that does not expand the IMF and removes it from the bans on LNG. This does not contain IMF reform. It does not take money from the DOD. I think that is good.

The Senator from Florida commented that we wouldn't be in the position we are in right now with the Europeans afraid to come to the aid of Ukraine if it weren't for the fact they are reliant upon Russia for their ability to produce LNG. We in this country have had a real boom in getting in the tight formations of the LNG. Right now we need to be exporting more of it to get the price up so it can be produced for ourselves in this country. No better way than to start exporting this to countries such as Ukraine. If we are doing this, the Western European countries would not be reliant upon Russia for that ability.

I think we have an opportunity there to do something with this bill, and hopefully we will be able to satisfy the needs of Ukraine and at the same time not provide further damage to our military.

I recognize that out of the \$315 million pricetag in total aid for the package, it rightly cuts \$150 million from the State Department. That is true. That is where it should come from. But it also then takes an equal amount—